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I n a book published in 1954 the author said: "By 1907 the proportion of the laws of war embodied in general convention(s) far exceeded, and still exceeds 
to this day, that of the law ofpeace."l What he failed to mention was that, apart 
from the 1925 Geneva Protocol concerning gas and bacteriological warfare,2 
the conventional law of war relating to the conduct of hostilities dated (and still 
dates) from 1907;3 and that there was not (and is not) a single piece of 
international legislation dealing specifically with what might well be considered 
a fairly important aspect of modem warfare-war in and from the air!4 
Shortly after the end of World War I an anonymous article 'appeared in the 
prestigious British Yearbook of International Law the thesis of which was that, the 
League of Nations having been established, it would be a "disastrous mistake" 
for the governments of member nations to use this new machinery to codify (or 
expand?) the law of war; and that the past failure of international law to provide 
viable solutions to the problems of peace was, at least in part, due to the 
preoccupation of writers and statesmen with the law of war and their consequent 
neglect of the law of peace. 5 Two arguments were advanced: first, that inasmuch 
as war had been abolished, there was no longer anything for the law of war to 
regulate;6 and second, that in any event there was no point in wasting time and 
7 
energy on rules of war because such rules would only be broken. These 
arguments did not go unchallenged;8 but that they prevailed with the majority 
of statesmen and international lawyers of the day is evident from the fact that 
the Third Hague Peace Conference, which had not been convened because of 
the advent of World War I, was never called into session and, despite the 
tremendous technological advances demonstrated during that war, the 
Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 19079 continued to 
be the latest expression of States with respect to the conduct of hostilities. lO 
Thus it was these Regulations, drafted in 1907, prior to the advent of such 
weapons as the tank and the airplane, weapons which had completely 
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revolutionized warfare, which constituted the basic rules governing hostilities 
during World War II. 
It could easily be assumed that the events ofW orld War II would have caused 
a less antagonistic attitude towards efforts to modernize the law of war.11 
However, such was not the case. In a statement which could have been written 
by our anonymous post-World War I author and his adherents, the International 
Law Commission made the following decision at its 1949 organizational 
meeting: 
"18. The Commission considered whether the laws of war should be selected as 
a topic for codification. It was suggested that, war having been outlawed, the regulation 
of its conduct had ceased to be relevant. On the other hand, the opinion was expressed 
that, although the term 'laws of war' ought to be discarded, a study of the rules 
governing the use of anned force-legitimate or illegitimate-might be useful .. 
. . The majority of the Commission declared itself opposed to the study of the 
problem at the present stage. It was considered that if the Commission, at the very 
beginning ofits work, were to undertake this study, public opinion might interpret its action 
as showing lack of corifidence in the efficiency of the means at the disposal of the United 
Nations for maintaining peace. ,,12 (Emphasis added.) 
As a result of that decision, and despite strong arguments in support of the need 
to modernize the law of war advanced by many of the leading international 
lawyers,13 the Commission has, more than twenty years later, never of its own 
volition considered any aspect of the law of war. At the present time, then, we 
are compelled to apply to wars being fought in the eighth decade of the 20th 
century rules governing the conduct of hostilities which were drafted in the first 
decade of that century. 14 Just imagine the chaos if we were using the traffic 
regulations of that earlier horse-and-buggy decade to regulate to day's traffic! 
Imagine Broadway and Forty-second Street with no traffic lights, no traffic 
policemen, no stop signs, and a five-mile per hour speed limit! But such are the 
rules under which the world community of nations, by its ostrich-like attitude, 
has permitted and continues to permit wars to be fought. 1S 
Like the anonymous writer after World War I and like the International Law 
Commission after World War II, the United Nations itself has long been 
extremely reluctant to exert any effort toward modernizing the law of war for 
fear that public opinion might interpret such action as lack of confidence in that 
organization's ability to maintain the peace.16 But more recently there is 
evidence that the General Assembly is becoming increasingly realistic in its 
approach to this problem and that humanitarian considerations are, at long last, 
having an effect. The International Conference on Human Rights, meeting in 
Teheran in May 1968, adopted a resolution which requested the General 
Assembly to invite the Secretary-General to study 
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"the need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for possible 
revision of existing Conventions to ensure the better protection of civilians, 
prisoners and combatants in all armed conflicts and the -rrohibition and limitation 
of the use of certain methods and means of warfare."l 
This Resolution, in tum, resulted in the adoption by the General Assembly of 
Resolution 2444 (XXIII); 18 the preparation of the study Respectfor Human Rights 
in Armed Conflict by the Secretary-General;19 and the adoption by the General 
Assembly on December 16, 1969, of Resolution 2597 (XXIV), the pertinent 
operative portions of which read as follows: 
1. Requests the Secretary-General to continue the study initiated by resolution 
2444 (XXIII), giving special attention to the need for protection of the rights 
of civilians and combatants in conflicts which arise from the struggles of peoples 
under colonial and foreign rule for liberation and self-determination and to 
the better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and 
rules to such conflicts; 
2. Requests the Secretary-General to consult and cooperate closely with the 
International Committee of the Red Cross in regard to the studies being 
undertaken by that body on this question; 
********* 
5. Decides to give the highest priority to this question at the twenty-fifth session 
of the General Assembly; 
6. II/vites the Secretary-General to present a further report on this subject to the 
General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session?O 
As it will have been noted from the foregoing, there is another powerful force 
at work in this area-the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRq?l 
Even during the arid period in the codification of the so-called "Hague" law of 
war22 after World War I, the ICRC was successful in obtaining the convening 
of a diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1929 which not only redrafted the 1906 
Geneva Convention,23 but also drafted the first convention dealing exclusively 
with the subject of prisoners of war?4 And in 1949, just shortly after the 
International Law Commission had reached its decision not to include the law 
of war on its agenda, another diplomatic conference was convened at Geneva 
at the instance of the ICRC and, based on many years of preparatory work by 
the ICRC, it drafted and adopted four humanitarian conventions,25 including 
the first ever to deal exclusively with the protection of civilians.26 Moreover, 
when Resolution 2444 (XXIII) was adopted by the General Assembly, its basis 
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was a resolution which had been adopted at the XXth International Conference 
of the Red Cross at Vienna in 1965;27 and at the XXIst International Conference 
of the Red Cross, held in Istanbul in September 1969, a number of relevant 
resolutions were adopted.28 Assuredly, with the General Assembly and the 
ICRC acting together in a concerted effort to reach the identical goal, the 
prospect for the revision and modernization of the law of war may now be 
viewed with some minimum degree of optimiS:{11. Of course, there is a long 
international road to travel from proposals, to draft convention, to diplomatic 
conference, to signed convention, to ratification by a sufficiently large number 
of States, including the great powers, to make any such revision and 
modernization meaningful?9 but the very willingness of the General Assembly 
to acknowledge that the problem exists is "a giant step forward for all mankind." 
It is perhaps appropriate to mention at this point a suggestion which has been 
offered in order to make work in this area more palatable to those who have 
heretofore opposed it. This suggestion is that the tenn "anned conflict" be used 
as a substitute for the word "war" in the context of rules governing hostilities. 
It will be recalled that in the 1949 decision of the International Law Commission 
not to enter this field, those who opposed that decision suggested that the tenn 
"laws of war" be discarded.30 The same suggestion is to be found in the ICRC's 
proposals and practice and is stated to be based ripon the need "to take account 
of the deep aspiration of the peoples to see peace installed.,,31 And the Report, 
AI7720, makes the same suggestion, but apparently for the perhaps more logical 
reason that "anned conflict" is a considerably more all-inclusive tenn, and 
h c: I b' di h'" ,,32 Wh h .. h t erelore ess su ~ect to spute, t an IS war. atever t e motivation, suc 
a change appears to be essentially one of semantics, and there does not appear 
to be any substantive objection to it. Moreover, if it will reduce opposition to 
the project for the revision and modernization of the applicable law, it will have 
served a useful and beneficial purpose.33 Accordingly, the balance of this paper 
will use the tenns "anned conflict," "rules of anned conflict," and "law of anned 
conflict," and, except where speaking historically, will pointedly refrain from 
the use of such antiquated tenns as "war," "rules of war," and "law of war"! 
Assuming then that the time is approaching when affinnative steps will be 
taken to revise and modernize the law of anned conflict, the question is presented 
as to the specific areas in which such revision and modernization is needed. Any 
attempt to answer that question completely would probably necessitate a listing 
which would cover many pages and explanatory matter which would fill many 
tomes. This paper, as its title indicates, will be limited to several matters 
considered to be the major inadequacies relating to the protection of individuals 
during anned conflict which presently exist and require correction. They are: 
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1. The non-existence of and the need for a method for the automatic 
detennination that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application 
of the law of anned conflict;34 
2. The non-existence of and the need for a method which will ensure the 
presence in the territory of each party to an anned conflict of a Protecting 
Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance 
with the law of anned conflict; 
3. The non-existence of and the need for a complete and total prohibition of the 
use in anned conflict of any and all categories of chemical and biological agents; 
and 
4. The non-existence of and the need for a complete code governing the use of 
air power in anned conflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition of any 
type ofbombing which has as its basic target the civilian population. 
In the discussion of each of these inadequacies in the present law governing 
armed conflict, an effort will be made to show the nature of the particular 
inadequacy and why it exists and to suggest possible remedies, with the caveat 
that the suggested remedies are not intended to exclude other, possibly more 
practical and practicable, solutions. In view of the very nature of the inadequacies 
discussed, there would appear to be litde need to advance arguments as to why 
each is deemed of sufficient import to be considered a major inadequacy 
requiring a remedy. 
1. The non-existence if and the need for a method for the automatic determination 
that a particular inter-State relationship requires the application if the law if armed conflict. 
One of the major inadequacies of the present law of armed conflict is that 
there is in existence no method for the automatic issuance of an authoritative 
and effective determination that the relationship between two or more States 
has reached a point where that law should be applied. 
Under Article 1 of the Third Hague Convention of 1907 hostilities were 
instituted by a "reasoned declaration of war or ... an ultimatum with conditional 
declaration of war"; and under Article 2 of that Convention the belligerents had 
the duty to notify neutrals of the existence of a state of war.35 Of course, were 
these provisions uniformly complied with by States, the problem under 
discussion would not exist. Unfortunately, more often than not they have been 
honored in the breach. In 1914, just seven years after they had become a part 
of international legislation, Germany attacked Belgium without a declaration of 
war and started a policy which has been followed all too frequendy since then.36 
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Moreover, a number of nations have denied the applicability of the law of war 
by the use of subterfuge or perversion of the facts. Thus, the Sino-Japanese 
conflict of the late 1930s was designated by Japan as a "police action" which, it 
was claimed, did not bring the law of war into effect; and in numerous other 
cases the applicability of the provisions of the 1907 Hague and of the 1929 
Geneva Conventions was rejected on the mere basis of a denial of the existence 
of a state of war-despite clear and undeniable evidence to the contrary. 
Concerning this situation the ICRC later said: 
". . . Since 1907 experience has shown that many anned conflicts, displaying all 
the characteristics of a war, may arise without being preceded by any of the 
formalities laid down in the Hague Convention. Furthermore, there have been 
many cases where Parties to a conflict have contested the legitimacy of the enemy 
Government and therefore refused to recognize the existence of a state of war. In 
the same way, the temporary disappearance of sovereign States as a result of 
annexation or capitulation has been put forward as a pretext for not observing one 
or other of the humanitarian Conventions. It was necessary to find a remedy to 
this state of affairs ... ,,37 
As the problem had thus long been recognized, in preparing the so-called 
Stockholm draft conventions (the working papers for the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference which drafted the four 1949 Geneva Conventions) the ICRC 
attempted to solve it by proposing the employment of a phrase making each 
Convention applicable "to all cases of declared war or any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if 
the state of war is not recognized by one of them." This proposal was adopted 
by the Diplomatic Conference without change and without debate.38 
A great feeling of accomplishment was engendered by the acceptance of this 
supposedly all-inclusive phrase by the Diplomatic Conference. The same ICRC 
study quoted above said of it: 
"By its general character, this paragraph deprives belligerents, in advance, of the 
pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There is 
no need for a formal declaration of war, or for the recognition of a state of war, 
as preliminaries to the application of the Convention . . . The occurrence of de 
facto hostilities is sufficient . . . Any difference arising between two States and 
leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces is an armed conflict 
within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of 
a state of war .... ,,39 
Unfortunately, it has not uniformly worked out this way in practice. Thus, 
for example, in Vietnam, where thousands of planes have been shot down, tens 
of thousands of human beings have been killed, and millions of rounds of 
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ammunition have been expended, the position has been taken by North Vietnam 
that the humanitarian conventions governing anned conflict, to which she long· 
40 
ago acceded, do not apply. 
Thus, after W orId War II it was considered necessary to evolve a method 
which would make it impossible for States to engage in armed conflict and 
attempt to justify non-compliance with the then law of war by denying the 
existence of a state of war through some subterfuge such as labelling it a "police 
action," alleging the lack of a declaration of war, etc. Now, once again, it is 
necessary to seek a method which will make it impossible for States to engage 
in armed conflict and attempt to justify non-compliance with the present (or 
future) law of armed conflict by advancing the same or new subterfuges, such 
as labelling the armed conflict as "legitimate self-defense," or as "assistance to 
an ally in an internal conflict," or as "assistance to peoples engaged in a national 
liberation movement aimed at throwing off the yoke of imperialism," etc.41 
And contriving new phrases of limitation will probably be no more successful 
in solving the problem than they have in the past as they would merely serve as 
a basis for future evasions of a different type. 
It is suggested that a true and effective solution could be attained by assigning 
the power to make a determination as to the existence of a state of anned ·conflict 
to a pre-selected international body; by making the decision reached by that 
body as to the existence of a state of anned conflict binding on the States direcdy 
involved, as well as on all other Parties to the Convention; and by providing for 
the automatic imposition of total sanctions whenever this body determines that 
its decision is not being respected by a State party to the armed conflict in that 
such State has, despite such decision, continued to deny the applicability of the 
law of armed conflict, or any part of it, or is, in fact, violating such law.42 
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference two proposals were made which can be 
related to this problem. The Greek representative suggested that the existence 
of a state of belligerency should be decided by the Security Council of the United 
Nations. He later amplified this proposal by explaining that he had meant that 
such recognition of belligerency should be given by a majority of the countries 
represented on the Security Council.43 A French proposal, which was actually 
concerned with the problem of a substitute for the Protecting Power, would 
have established on a permanent basis, immediately upon the Conventions 
becoming effective, a "High International Committee for the Protection of 
Humanity," consisting of thirty members elected by the Parties to the 
Convention from nominations made by the Parties, by the Hague "International 
[permanent] Court of Arbitration," and by the "International Red Cross 
Standing Committee." Nominations were to be made from 
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"amongst persons of high standing, without distinction of nationality, known for 
their moral authority, their spiritual and intellectual independence and the services 
they have rendered to humanity-" 
"In particular, they may be selected from amongst persons distinguished in the 
political, religious, scientific and legal domains, and amongst winners of the Nobel 
Peace Prize--,,44 
While this proposal was not incorporated into the Conventions, it was the 
subject of a resolution adopted by the Diplomatic Conference which 
recommended that consideration be given as soon as possible to the advisability 
of setting up an international body to ~erform the functions of a Protecting 
Power in the absence of such a Power.4 
These two proposals are mentioned here because they suggest alternative 
methods of attempting to solve our problem: one by the use of an established 
political body; the other by the use of a new body created specifically for the 
purpose and which is made as neutral and apolitical as it is possible to do in these 
days ofhypernationalism. 
The suggested use of the Security Council (or, indeed, of any political body) 
is not considered to be a feasible solution. That body is composed of the 
representatives of States, voting on the basis of decisions reached in Foreign 
Offices, decisions which are made on the basis of self-interest and political 
expediency, and which are not necessarily consonant with the facts. It is 
inconceivable, for example, that the Security Council would ever reach a 
decision, over the opposition of North Vietnam (and, more important, of the 
Soviet Union), that the situation in Vietnam demands the application of the 
humanitarian conventions which govern the law of armed conflict.46 
On the other hand, a specially constituted body of perhaps twenty-five 
individuals, each of whom is of sufficient personal international stature to be 
above politics and would act as an individual and as his or her moral and ethical 
principles dictated, detached and unaffected by instructions, could well 
constitute an acceptable and effective international body. The provisions for the 
selection of the members of this body (the "International Commission for the 
Enforcement of Humanitarian Rights during Armed Conflict"-ICEHRAC) 
would be sufficiendy restrictive to ensure the choice of the type of individual 
described, without regard to nationality, race, religion, color, or geographical 
distribution. The ICEHRAC would be selected as soon as the constitutive 
convention had become effective and would be a permanent body, perhaps 
self-perpetuating.47 Any Party to the convention, whether or not itselfinvolved, 
could, at any time, request a determination by ICEHRAC as to whether the 
relationship between two or more States was such as to call into effect the 
application of the law of armed conflict; the States involved would be invited 
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to present any facts or arguments they desired but would not otherwise 
participate in the decision-making process;48 an affirmative decision would 
immediately be binding not only upon the States involved, but on all of the 
other Parties to the Convention; and a subsequent finding by ICEHRAC that 
its decision was not being complied with would automatically, and without 
further action of any kind, require the application of complete economic and 
communications sanctions against the violating State by all of the other Parties 
h C . 49 to t e onventlon. 
To many this proposal will undoubtedly appear Utopian, idealistic, and 
impractical. However, upon reflection this reaction may appear somewhat less 
valid. There are today more than one hundred States which are not presently 
involved in the type of armed conflict under discussion. Each and every one of 
them considers that should it become involved in such activities in the future, 
it would be on the side of the angels--so the provisions of any such convention 
would naturally apply in its favor and against the opponent. Moreover, to what 
will it have agreed? Merely that a neutral, internationally-created body, which 
it helped create, may determine that a situation in which that State unexpectedly 
finds itself calls for the application of the humanitarian law of armed conflict. 
What would that mean to it? Only that it could not kill, or otherwise maltreat, 
protected persons such as the sick and wounded, prisoners of war, and civilian 
noncombatants, and that it could not have recourse to certain prohibited 
methods of conducting hostilities. Can any State advance the argument that it 
refuses to ratify such a convention because it does not wish its sovereign power 
of action limited in these respects, it wishes to retain the unfettered ability to 
kill and maltreat these people at will and that it wishes, for example, to retain 
the possibility of using weapons which have been banned?50 Moreover, once 
such a convention is drafted and presented for signature and ratification, the 
moral and humanitarian pressure to bring about ratifications would be 
tremendous and there would be an excellent possibility of its general 
acceptance.51 While certain States which have adopted obsolete attitudes 
magnifying national sovereignty might well oppose such a proposal from 
beginning to end, it is predictable that they would participate, albeit reluctantly, 
in the diplomatic conference which was convened to draft such a convention 
and would eventually, rather than risk international opprobrium, become Parties 
. 52 to It. 
This, then, is the suggested remedy to the problem of establishing a method 
for the automatic determination that an existing situation necessitates the 
application of the law of armed conflict. While it would, it is true, entail a 
somewhat broader delegation of authority than States have heretofore been 
willing to make, it is believed that the time is past when States may argue 
"national sovereignty" as an excuse for refusing to participate in the creation of 
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an international institution the sole function of which will be to limit the illegal 
and nonhumanitarian conduct of hostilities in anned conflict. 
2. The non-existence of and the need for a method which will ensure the presence in 
the territory of each State party to an armed coriflict of a Protecting Power or an international 
body with adequate authority to police compliance with that law. 
Another major inadequacy in the old law of war and in the present law of 
armed conflict is that there has never been an "umpire" with sufficient authority 
to oversee the application of the law, to investigate alleged or possible violations, 
to determine the facts with respect thereto, and to take the necessary action to 
ensure the correction of the default. 
For many centuries there has existed in customary international law an 
institution known as the Protecting Power. By the time of the Spanish-American 
War (1898), the traditional functions of that Protecting Power had come to 
include some aspects of the protection of prisoners of war. 53 During World War 
I a number of formal agreements were entered into confirming the existence of 
the Protecting Power and its activities with respect to prisoners of war, which 
had until then rested entirely on custom, and specifying a number offunctions.54 
Subsequendy, in Article 86 of the 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention55 
this institution received formal recognition in a general multilateral treaty 
concerned with ensuring humanitarian treatment for one class of victims of war. 
The four 1949 Geneva Conventions reaffirm the Protecting Power as an 
international humanitarian institution.56 There is now, therefore, binding 
international legislation establishing the Protecting Power as an international 
institution during time of anned conflict and specifying a number of its duties 
and powers with respect to the protection of wounded and sick, prisoners of 
war, and civilian noncombatants. Unfortunately, the provision concerning the 
original designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents is less than clear, 
apparendy relying on customary international law in this respect, although a 
great deal of time, effort, and controversy were expended at the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference with respect to the designation of replacements and substitutes for 
an original Protecting Power. 57 In any event, although there have probably been 
close to one hundred armed conflicts of various sorts and sizes since the end of 
World War II, the institution of the Protecting Power has not once during that 
period been called into being.58 While the Report advances a number of possible 
reasons for this failure,59 it is believed that many of them are completely 
irrelevant and that, for the most part, the failure to secure the designation of 
such a Power has resulted from the fact that the States involved did not wish to 
have on their territory a neutral presence concerned with the problem of the 
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extent to which there was compliance with the provisions of the specifically 
h ·· . . thl f d nfli60 umarutanan convennons goverrung e aw 0 arme co ct. 
The failure of the Protecting Power as an institution and the need for some 
effective system of supervision appears to be very generally admitted. Thus in 
answer to the Secretary General's inquiry concerning the preparation of his 
Report, India stated that it believed that the solution to the problem "would 
perhaps be found more through the complete implementation of the existing 
conventions than through the search for new legal instruments.,,61 And the 
response of the United States acknowledged "a strongly held conviction that 
steps are urgendy needed to secure better apElication of existing humanitarian 
international conventions to armed conflicts."o2 Similarly, the Report states that 
"there would be pressing need for measures to improve and strengthen the present 
system of international supervision and assistance to parties to armed conflicts in 
their observance of humanitarian norms of international law .... ,,63 
And another organization concerned with preserving humanitarian rights 
said, with respect to the Protecting Power: 
"Certainly it is time that this valuable international custom was revived in the 
modem context of armed conflicts. An initiative of this kind by the United Nations 
would set a precedent as a means oflessening the brutality of conflicts, and would 
accord with the aim expressed in the Charter .... ,,64 
And, finally, Resolution XI of the XXlst International Conference of the Red 
Cross "calls upon all parties to allow the Protecting Power or the International 
Committee of the Red Cross free access to prisoners of war and to all places of 
their detention.,,65 Further, it should be borne in mind that nowhere in either 
customary or conventional international law is there any rule which would 
authorize the Protecting Power, even if it were designated and functioning, to 
supervise the compliance of a belligerent with that area of the law of armed 
fli . h d fh tili·· 66 con ct goverrung t e con uct 0 os nes. 
Although, as has been stated, no Protecting Power has been designated in 
any armed conflict which has occurred since World War II, on a number of 
occasions the ICRC has been permitted to perform its humanitarian functions.67 
Perhaps because of this, the Report calls it the most effective private organization 
concerned with respect for human rights in armed conflict, ascribes this to "its 
history, past experience, and its established and well deserved reputation of 
impartiality," and recommends its strengthening.68 But not even the ICRC has 
been uniformly successful in having its services accepted. Thus, while it was 
permitted to perform humanitarian functions in the prisoner-of-war camps 
maintained in South Korea during the period of hostilities in that country 
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(1950-53), it was never pennitted in North Korea where, as a result, there was 
no "guardian" of the Conventions; 69 similarly, while it has functioned in South 
Vietnam over a considerable period of time, it has never been pennittedin North 
Vietnam?O and its trials and tribulations in Biafra and Nigeria are too recent to 
. lb' 71 reqmre e a oratlon. 
There is, then, a double need in this area: (1) a need to devise a method which 
will ensure the existence of a "third" presence, either a Protecting Power or 
some substitute therefor, on the territory of each State party to an armed conflict; 
and (2) a need to grant to that Protecting Power, or the substitute therefor, 
adequate authority to ensure compliance with all of the law of armed conflict, 
including that relating to the conduct ofhostilities.72 The provisions of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions for the designation of Protecting Powers have not been 
at all effective 73 and those relating to substitutes for Protecting Powers have 
been only partially successful. It is apparent, then, that the only real solution 
would be, once again, to have a provision in a convention which would, in 
appropriate cases, automatically trigger action by ICEHRAC?4 Thus the 
convention creating that institution could provide that, when the existence of 
a state of armed conflict is acknowledged by the States involved, or when a 
decision to that effect has been reached by ICEHRAC in accordance with the 
other provisions of the convention, and no Protecting Powers have been 
designated in accordance with customary intemationallaw75 within one week 
thereafter, ICEHRAC would automatically begin to function in the capacity of 
a substitute for the Protecting Power, with all the rights and duties which have 
been, or which may be, granted to such Powers?6 And such rights and duties 
should include the supervision of the application of all of the law of armed 
conflict and should not be restricted to the protections afforded under the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. After all, a human being, combatant or noncombatant, 
suffers just as much, or is just as dead, be his improp er treatment due to a violation 
of those conventions or to the use of dum-dum bullets (in violation of the 1899 
Hague Declaration), or the use of poison (in violation of the 1907 Hagt!e 
Regulations), or the use of gas (in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol), etc.77 
In many respects the foregoing proposal parallels suggestions contained in the 
Report?8 Nor is it believed that the U.S.S.R. and the other Communist 
countries would necessarily oppose such a solution merely because they made 
reservations to Article 10/10/10/11,19 and because the Soviet Union made a 
statement indicating that it did not consider Resolution 2 of the 1949 Diplomatic 
80 Conference necessary. Events subsequent to 1949 have demonstrated the need 
for an institution capable of perfonning the functions of the Protecting Power 
and competent to take such functions upon itself immediately when the need 
therefor becomes apparent.81 It is believed that only in this fashion will the world 
community of nations provide a satisfactory and effective method of ensuring 
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in every case of anned conflict the presence of an impartial agency with the 
function of making certain that the law of anned conflict is fully and properly 
Ii d 82 app e . 
3. The non-existence cif and the need Jor a complete and total prohibition cif the use 
in armed conflict cif any and all categories cif chemical and biological agents. 
A third major inadequacy in the existing law relating to the protection of 
individuals during anned conflict is the lack of a comprehensive and generally 
accepted ban on the use as weapons of all types and categories of both chemical 
and biological agents. 
While there is probably no real equal to the disaster that would descend upon 
this earth should an all-out nuclear war occur, potentially the use of other 
uncontrollable methods of mass destruction could be almost equally disastrous 
for mankind.83 Dozens of chemical agents, and numerous biological agents,84 
all with varying degrees oflethality, that have been determined to be the most 
"useful" are now included in the arsenals of a number of nations for possible use 
in the event of anned conflict.85 Hundreds of books and articles have been 
written86 and millions of words have been spoken87 on the subject. For the 
most part they have been concerned with the questions of whether there is today 
any customary rule of international law which prohibits the use of chemical 
agents in anned conflict and whether biological agents fall within the 
well-established prohibitions against the use of "poisons" and against the use of 
weapons which cause "unnecessary suffering"; but also, in more recent days, 
\vith the inhumanity of these weapons and the highlighting of the moral and 
ethical basis for the universal acceptance by nations of a strict and all-inclusive 
ban on the use in anned conflict of any and all types of both chemical and 
b· I . al 88 10 OglC agents. 
A very brief history of the attempts to ban the use of chemical (and 
bacteriological) agents as weapons will probably serve to clarify the current 
problem as well as the suggestion for solving it. Chemical warfare of differing 
varieties has existed for centuries.89 Although the 1868 Declaration of St. 
Petersburg90 actually dealt with explosive bullets, it is often cited as the beginning 
of the attempt to ban the use of chemical agents in anned conflict because of a 
preambular clause which deplored "the employment of anns which uselessly 
aggravate the suffering of disabled men, or render their death inevitable." 
Chemical agents, it is contended, fall within this classification. 
The 1899 Hague Peace Conference adopted a number of provisions which 
are said to have indirecdy, or which did direcdy, ban the use of chemical agents. 
Thus the Regulations attached to the Second Hague Convention91 drafted by 
that Conference stated that the right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring 
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the enemy was not unlimited (Art. 22) and they especially prohibited the 
employment of poison or poisoned weapons (Art. 23a) and of arms, projectiles, 
or material of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering (Art. 23e). In addition, a 
Declaration concerning the Prohibition of Using Projectiles the Sole Object of 
which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases was drafted.92 While 
this Declaration was not repeated at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference, the 
provisions of the Regulations attached to the Fourth Hague Convention of 
190793 were identical with those cited from its 1899 predecessor. 
World War I saw the use of gas introduced by Germany, followed thereafter 
by its use by the Allies. The Treaty of Versailles contained an article which stated 
that the "use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices being prohibited, their manufacture and importation are 
stricdy forbidden in Germany.,,94 Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to 
say that when the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919 there was in existence 
any generally accepted rule of international law prohibiting the use of chemical 
agents in armed conflict. In 1922 the five great maritime nations of that time 
(France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States) drafted and 
signed the Treaty of Washington relating to the use of submarines and noxious 
gases which contained a provision that, the use of "asphyxiating, poisonous or 
other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been jusdy 
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world and a prohibition of 
such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority of the civilized 
Powers are parties," the signatories "declare their assent to such prohibition. ,,95 
While this treaty never became effective (France failed to ratifY it because of the 
provisions relating to submarines), it constituted an important landmark in the 
law of armed conflict. And three years later, at the Conference which met in 
Geneva to establish controls on international trade in munitions,96 a Protocol 
was drafted which contained wording lifted bodily from the Treaty of 
Washington and, in addition, contained an agreement "to extend this 
prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods ofwarfare.,,97 As of October 
30, 1969, there were 68 States parties to this 1925 Geneva Protocol. 98 The great 
majority, however, have ratified it with reservations which make it applicable 
only as regards other States which are also Parties to it; and which make it 
inapplicable in the event it is violated by the enemy.99 
Gas was subsequendy used by Italy against Ethiopia in the 1935-36 war.100 
Italy admitted this use in the League of Nations and unsuccessfully attempted to 
justifY it as a reprisal for other alleged violations of international law by Ethiopia. 
Japan used gas against China in their hostilities of the late 1930s; and the Soviet 
Union contended that Japan used bacteriological agents against China in the 
1930s. This was never established by acceptable evidence and, so far as appears, 
there was no use in armed conflict of either chemical or bacteriological weapons 
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by any belligerent during World War II.101 During the Korean hostilities the 
Soviet Union, Communist China, and North Korea all contended that the 
United States forces in the United Nations Command had used bacteriological 
weapons.102 The United States denied this and demanded an investigation 
which was refused. It is interesting to note that in an official book published in 
Moscow in 1967 no mention is made of these allegations, although the charge 
against the Japanese is reiterated and the use of defoliants in Vietnam is strongly 
criticized.1 3 The charge was also made, and apparendy verified by the ICRC, 
that Egypt used a chemical agent against the Royalists in the Yemen. 104 Egypt 
denied the charge and invited an investigation. As in the case of the similar 
demand made by the United States in Korea, no such investigation ever took 
place. 
The ICRC Draft Rules contain a blunt and broad prohibition against the use 
of "incendiary, chemical, bacteriological, radioactive or other agents,,;10S on a 
number of occasions the General Assembly has adopted resolutions calling for 
strict observance of the "principles and ob~ectives" of the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
and inviting non-Parties to accede to it; 06 and on at least one occasion it has 
declared the use of chemical and biological agents of warfare "as contrary to the 
generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the ProtocoL,,107 
Some writers also urge that the use of these weapons is prohibited by customary 
international law. 108 It appears however that, particularly in the light of recent 
developments, this is a sterile approach to the problem. 
When the 1925 Geneva Protocol was sent to the United States Senate for its 
advice and consent to ratification, this was refused; and accordingly, the United 
States is not presendy a Party to the ProtocoL 109 As a result, the United States 
has long taken the position that, while it will not be the first user of the weapons 
prohibited by that international agreement, it "is not a party to any treaty, now 
in force, that prohibits or restricts the use in warfare of toxic or nontoxic gases, 
of smoke or incendiary materials, or of bacteriological warfare.,,110 Although 
the United States has not used any toxic chemical, or any bacteriological agent, 
since the Protocol became effective as between the Parties to it, the fact that it 
refused to ratifY the Protocol has not only caused it to have problems in the 
diplomatic field,lll but has also undoubtedly deterred a number of other States 
from becoming Parties to it. 
On November 25,1969, President Nixon made an announcement of major 
. . hi b· 112 Thi . I d d Importance concerrung t s su ~ect. s announcement mc u e : 
1. A reaffinnation of the renunciation by the United States of the first use of 
lethal chemical weapons; 
2. An extension of this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals; 
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3. An intention to resubmit the 1925 Geneva Protocol to the Senate forits advice 
and consent to ratification; 
4. Renunciation by the United States of the use oflethal biological agents and 
weapons; 
5. Confining biological research to defense measures; 
6. Disposing of all stocks of bacteriological weapons; and 
7. Associating the United States with the principles and objectives of the United 
Kingdom Draft Convention on biological weapons.113 
It is assumed that this action by the United States, its prospective ratification of 
the 1925 Geneva Protocol, and its expressed willingness to become a party to a 
convention banning biologicals will lead the way to the goal which the United 
Nations General Assembly has long sought to reach-universal acceptance of 
prohibitions on chemical and biological agents and weapons. 114 Unfortunately, 
it appears that there is still one major problem which requires solution-the 
status of the use of certain types of chemical agents. For while diplomats, 
scientists, and international lawyers are, for the most part, in general agreement 
that lethal gases and all biologicals either are, or should be, prohibited by the 
law of armed conflict, there is no such concordance with respect to: the so-called 
non-lethal gases, such as tear gas (CS); incendiaries, such as napalm; and 
defoliants. Moreover, the use of all of these weapons by the United States in 
Vietnam has considerably exacerbated this problem. 
The difference of opinion with respect to both the legal and the moral aspects 
of the problem of the use of non-lethal or incapacitating chemicals such as tear 
gas (lachrymatories) is evidenced by the division among the group of experts 
convened by the ICRC: 
" ... Some [experts] ... wondered whether the employment against the enemy 
of chemical agents involving no serious danger for health might not in the final 
issue be of a more humanitarian character than many other means of warfare. The 
employment of means such as police gases (lachrymatory and others) is admitted 
on the national level: why could they not a fortiori be admitted against the 
enemy?" 
"Other experts, on the contrary. considered that the prohibition in the 1925 
Geneva Protocol should be taken as covering all gases, including those not direcdy 
poisonous. in virtue of the deliberately broad terms of this prohibition in the 
Protocol ... ,,115 
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In 1930 the United Kingdom took the position that the use of smoke did not 
violate the Protocol but that the use of tear gas did; but recendy a spokesman 
for that country stated that to day's tear gas is less harmful to man than was the 
1930 smoke; that it is used widely for domestic purposes for riot control; and 
h · . hib· db· . al . 116 t at 1ts use 1S not pro 1te y any mtematlon conventlon. 
Apart from the fact that even a non-lethal, incapacitating gas will occasionally 
cause a fatality, there are two major objections voiced against their use in armed 
conflict: first, that as a practical matter the legality of their use becomes extremely 
debatable when its purpose is "to enhance the effectiveness of conventional 
weapons,',117 "to force ~ersons from protective covering to face attack by 
fragmentation bombs"; 11 and second, and more important, that the use of any 
chemical, albeit non-lethal, results inevitably in escalation: "except perhaps 
when they are first used, non-lethal chemical weapons are unlikely to have much 
effect except to set the stage for more deadly CBW operations.,,119 
The second chemical weapon in the controversial area is napalm-an 
extremely effective weapon and hence one which is much feared,120 and much 
denounced.121 Once again there is no general afeement as to whether this 
chemical weapon is prohibited by the Protoco1.12 And because the answer to 
this question is even more difficult to ascertain than is that with respect to 
lachrymatories, the position has been taken that it may be used, but only in a 
discriminating manner.123 The suggestion is made in AI7720 that in measures 
of control and disarmament incendiary weapons such as napalm should be 
considered separately from chemical and biological weapons and that a new 
. . d d 1 rify h· . 124 . hi h . b bi conventlon 1S nee e to cat e s1tuatlOn; a suggestlon w c 1S pro a y 
an admission that this is presendy a gray area of the law. 
Prior to Vietnam defoliants had never been used in warfare. As- a result, there 
is no real experience upon which scientists can base their opinions as to the 
ecological effects of their use.125 Here, as in the case of napalm, the suggestion 
has been made that the legality of their use depends upon the purpose or target: 
while it might be permissible to use them on a forest area used by combat troops, 
it would not be permissible to use them on farm lands raising crops to feed the 
civilian population. Apart from the fact that it would frequendy be all but 
impossible to make the correct determinations, if the use of defoliants does 
change the ecology, then it would appear that the purpose or target should not 
b h d .. f: . hi d· . h . 126 e t e eterrrurung actor m reac ng a eC1S10n on t e1r use. 
Because the use of non-lethal, or incapacitating, chemical agents will 
inevitably lead to the use of other, more lethal, chemical agents; because napalm 
can cause both asphyxiation and unnecessary suffering; because defoliants may 
well change the entire ecology of an area and could lead to the starvartion of 
the civilian population; because of these and many other reasons, it is believed 
that to be successful any prohibition on the use of chemical weapons in armed 
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conflict must comprise all types of chemical agents, including those just 
mentioned. It is on this basis that it is urged that there is a vital humanitarian 
need for a universally accepted understanding that the prohibition of the use in 
armed conflict of chemical agents includes any and all categories of such agents, 
1 di · .. . di' d d r. Ii 127 not exc u ng mcapacitatmg gases, mcen anes, an elo ants. 
There is comparatively Iitde dispute on the need for a far-reaching prohibition 
on the use of biologicals in armed conflict. As has been noted, there is general 
agreement that, like a nuclear war, a biological war would constitute a disaster 
to all mankind, belligerent and neutral, combatant and noncombatant.128 One 
grave problem in this area is that even a small, comparatively undeveloped nation 
could conceivably mass the necessary resources to enter this field-and there is 
considerable dispute as to whether an inspection system, even if adopted, could 
function effectively.129 The United Kingdom Draft Convention on the subject 
of biological weapons does not provide for inspections except in the context of 
a specific complaint.130 But, while every effort should most certainly be made 
to devise means of ensuring against the illegal production and storage of 
biological agents of military relevance by any nation, large or small, industrial 
or undeveloped, this should not be permitted to unduly delay agreement on a 
treaty completely oudawing the use in armed conflict of any and all biological 
agents. 
4. The non-existence cif and the need for a complete code governing the use cif air power 
in armed coriflict with emphasis on the outright prohibition cif any type cifbombing which 
has as its basic target the civilian population. 
The airplane was first successfully flown in 1903, just shordy prior to the 
Second Hague Conference of 1907; it developed into a military weapon of 
sizable proportions during World War I; during the between-wars period it 
became obvious that it was a major military weapon; during and since World 
War II technological advances in this field have been such that its importance 
in the military arsenal is now unequalled (except for the nuclear ballistic missile); 
and yet its use in armed conflict remains essentially unregulated! 
In 1917, while the airplane was still in swaddling clothes, exponents of the 
use of air power had already evolved the theory that 
"the day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy 
lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become 
th .. al . f ,,131 e pnnClp operatlons 0 war. 
While strategic bombing was probably not the "principal operation" ofW orld 
War II, it certainly played a most important role in that war and will do so again 
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in any future non-nuclear anned conflict-and perhaps even in one involving 
132 the use of nuclear weapons. 
As in the case of the discussion of chemical and biological weapons, while it 
is unproductive to argue about whether or not the strategic bombing ofW orld 
War II violated intemationallaw, 133 a brief survey of what has transpired in the 
past will prove helpful in approaching the problem from the point of view of 
the future. When the Second Hague Peace Conference met in 1907 the balloon 
was more than a century old and had already been used for military purposes, 
while the airplane had been successfully flown for the first time only four years 
before. The Conference adopted a Declaration prohibiting bombing "from 
balloons or by other new methods of a similar nature,,134 and Conventions 
which included restrictions on land bombardment and naval bombardment. 
Article 25 of the Regulations on the Laws and Customs ofWar135 provided: 
"The attack or bombardment by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or 
buildings which are undefended is prohibited." (Emphasis added.) 
The records of the Conference indicate that the words "by whatever means" 
were included in the article in order to cover air bombardment. 136 And Article 
2 of the Convention on Naval Bombardment137 excluded from the prohibition 
against the bombing of undefended places "military works, military or naval 
establishments, depots of arms or war materiel, workshops or plants which could 
be utilized for the needs of the hostile fleet or army." The argument has been 
advanced, not without justification, that this provision provides a basis for the 
air bombardment in the "hinterland" of objectives such as those enumerated. 
This was the extent of the efforts which had been made to control the use of 
air power when World War I began; and during its course the airplane became 
a full-fledged weapon. However, apart from a few incidents its use was restricted 
to the battlefield and, usually, to air-to-air duels. 138 In view of the technological 
progress made and foreseen, it is indeed strange that although a number of efforts 
were made in the between-wars period to obtain an international agreement on 
such matters as air bombardment none was successful.139 The most authoritative 
of these failures was the drafting of the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare.140 
Two articles of those Rules are particularly relevant: Article 22, which would 
have prohibited aerial bombardment which was "for the purpose of terrorizing 
the civilian population ... or of injuring noncombatants"; and Article 24, which 
would have limited it to specified military objectives in the vicinity of the zone 
ofland operations and then only ifit would result in a distinct military advantage 
and ifit could be accomplished without "indiscriminate" bombing of the civilian 
population. These two articles were intended: (1) to preserve the traditional 
distinction between combatant and noncombatant; and (2) to limit the allowable 
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military objectives to those in the area of the combat zone-the so-called 
"occupation bombardment" because it is normally preliminary to physical 
occupation. 
In a discussion of air bombardment in the House of Commons onJune 21, 
1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain made the following statement: 
"I think we may say that there are, at any rate, three rules of intemational law or 
three principles of international law which are as applicable to warfare from the 
air as they are to war at sea or on land. In the first place, it is against international 
law to bomb civilians as such and to make deliberate attacks upon civilian 
populations. That is undoubtedly a violation of international law. In the second 
place, targets which are aimed at from the air must be legitimate military objectives 
and must be capable of identification. In the third place, reasonable care must be 
taken in attacking these military objectives so that by carelessness a civilian 
population in the neighborhood is not bombed.,,141 
When World War II erupted in September 1939, President Roosevelt 
immediately sent the belligerents a plea against the bombing of civilian 
populations. The British, French, and Germans all replied that their planes were 
instructed to attack military objectives only.142 In March 1940 the ICRC made 
an appeal to the belligerents "to confirm general immunity for peaceful 
populations, to define their military 0 bj ectives, and to refrain from indiscriminate 
bombardments and reprisals." Once again the bellif.;erents responded 
affirmatively-but continued to act as they felt necessary.1 The estimate has 
been made that while World War I caused 10 million deaths, of which 500,000 
were civilians, World War II caused 50 million, of which 24 million were 
civilians; and that half of the civilian deaths (12 million) were caused by air 
raids!144 It is worthy of note, too, that such air attacks were not specifically 
included in the definition of war crimes in the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal and that there were no post-war trials based on a charge of 
indiscriminate bombardment of the civilian population.145 Nevertheless, 
Spaight takes the position that "nothing that has happened in the second world 
h hak h I al b·· . di .. b b' ,,146 war as s en t e eg 0 ~ectlon to 10 scnrrunate om mg. 
It is apparent from the foregoing that the attempt to control aerial 
bombardment juridically has been based on analogy to two classical principles 
of land and sea warfare: (1) the distinction between combatant and 
noncombatant; and (2) the restricting oflawful targets to military objectives.147 
Much of the humanitarian law regulating armed conflict which has been 
accepted during the past century has been based upon the distinction between 
combatant and noncombatant. The airman who has crashed and been 
hospitalized, the sailor who has been rescued from the sea by the enemy after 
his ship has been sunk, the soldier who has been captured on the field of 
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battle--all of these have been removed from combatant status and are therefore 
entitled to the humanitarian protection afforded by international law. But they 
are but a comparatively small percentage of the overall group of noncombatants, 
the vast majority of whom are simply civilians, persons who are not a part of 
the armed forces of a belligerent. It is with these latter that we are presently 
concerned. The distinction between combatant and civilian has been termed, 
and properly so, "the fundamental principle of the law of war." 148 But air warfare 
in general, and strategic bombing in particular, has tended to blur that 
di · . 149 d . alidi h b . d 150 stmctlOn an lts v ty as een questlOne . 
Let us take three examples. First, a city of 500,000 population located in the 
"hinterland" (deep inside the country and far from the scene of actual land 
combat) has no factories making any product in support of the country's war 
effort. Is the city a proper target for air bombardment? Second, suppose that this 
same city has in its midst a factory employing 1000 workers making a very 
important instrument of war. Is the factory, or the city, a proper target for air 
bombardment? And third, suppose that the same city has within its area a number 
of factories making important instruments of war, and employing the entire 
work force of the city. Are the factories, or is the city, a proper target for air 
bombardment? 
Under the classical rules discussed and enumerated above, to bomb the city 
with no war production factories would be terror bombing, pure and simple, 
and would be a violation of the law of armed conflict. It would be an attack on 
a non-military objective which could be of no military advantage to the attacker 
except the possible demoralization of the enemy civilian population. With 
respect to this type of activity Lauterpacht has said: 
". . . it is in that prohibition, which is a clear rule of law, of intentional 
terrorization-or destruction-of the civilian population as an avowed or obvious 
object of attack that lies the last vestige of the claim that war can be legally regulated 
at all. Without that irreducible principle of restraint there is no limit to the license 
d d . ffc ,,151 an epravlty 0 orce .... 
Even the proponents of more "liberal" rules of air bombardment do not assert 
the legality of bombing of this type.152 
What of the large city with only one small factory in which is made a product 
of value to its country's war-effort? Certainly the bombing and destruction of 
such a factory would meet the test of resulting in a distinct military advantage 
to the attacker. It would not meet the test of being located in the zone of 
operations-but is that test, originally established when only cities in the zone 
ofland operations could be reached by artillery bombardment, a valid test to be 
applied to air bombardment which can reach anywhere in the world? Moreover, 
it would meet the test of the requirements for naval bombardment. It would 
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probably not meet the test of being located where the bombing can take place 
without danger to the civilian population. However, it appears that practice 
during and since World War II would permit the factory to be subjected to air 
attack. As the Report points out, in recent armed conflicts belligerents have 
frequendy made accusations of attacks upon non-military objectives and the 
enemy belligerent has denied the fact without either side questioning the 
. f h di' . f b' . 153 propnety 0 t e stmctlon as to types 0 0 ~ectlves. 
Finally, what of the large city with many factories and most of the work force 
engaged in the war effort? Let us assume that in time of armed conflict 40% of 
the population constitute the work force-but that still means that 60% of the 
civilian population, 300,000 people of this city, is made up of women, children, 
aged, sick, etc. Must the attacker pick out individual targets, the real military 
objectives? Or may he blanket the entire city with bombs, thus ensuring that all 
of the plants are destroyed-but also ensuring that a large part of the population, 
worker and nonworker, is likewise destroyed? Spaight would answer this latter 
question in the affirmative. He says: 
" ... There are in any given enemy city thousands of civilians, of'noncombatants' 
in the old sense, but there are also thousands who cannot be called 'noncombatants' 
in any true meaning of the tenn. The fonner suffer inevitably because the latter 
have, quite properly, to be prevented from pursuing their lethal activities. It is a 
tragedy of juxtaposition which is not entirely without precedent. Noncombatants 
have often suffered in bombardments by land and naval forces, but their suffering 
has never been held to make the bombardment illegal .... ,,154 
And he repeatedly asserts that so-:called "target-area bombing" is an "established 
usage" and that it "cannot be considered to offend against the principles of the 
international law ofwar.,,155 The problem which then confronts us is that we 
have returned to the doctrine of "total war,,,156 war as fought centuries ago: 
when the besieged city fell, all of its inhabitants were slaughtered and the city 
itself was put to the torch. 
The Report makes .the suggestion with respect to strategic bombing 
conducted on a target-area basis that "(it) would seem that measures to examine 
the effects of this kind of military operations within their legal context may now 
be desirable, and the question of defining limits might be usefully studied.,,157 
With this modest proposal there can be no possible dispute. The question which 
then presents itself is, what are possible solutions to the problem? And, which 
of these possible solutions offers the greatest amount of protection to the civilian 
ul . .,158 pop atlon! 
Air bombardment could, of course, be limited to areas where combat is 
actually taking place-the old concept of the "zone of operations." This, in 
effect, means tactical bombing, and would preclude strategic bombing. While 
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this would, in large part, solve the problem, it is extremely doubtful that it would 
be possible to secure the agreement of Governments to such a stringent rule. 
Moreover, even if the agreement of Governments were obtained, it is doubtful 
that there would be compliance with such a rule in practice. 
The Report proposes the establishment of safety zones,159 apparendy similar to, 
but much larger than, the hospital zones referred to in Annex I to the First and 
Fourth Geneva Conventions of 1949.160 Presumably there would be no bombing 
whatsoever permitted within the safety zones and no restrictions on bombing 
elsewhere. While this might work for small groups and in small areas, it appears to 
be totally impractical for the protection of tens or hundreds of millions of civilians. 
The logistic problem alone would be insurmountable; and with thousands of square 
miles within a safety zone, the unlawful use of such areas for the protection of 
important military matters would probably be inevitable. 
The Draft Rules prepared by the ICRC and submitted to the XIXth 
International Conference of the Red Cross at New Delhi in 1957161 contain a 
number of provisions intended to provide maximum protection for the civilian 
population. An examination of the various provisions of these Draft Rules makes 
it clear why they were received by the Governments with a "crushing silence." 
While they are, as would be expected, as humanitarian as it would be possible 
to draft such rules, they are also impractical to the point where it is extremely 
doubtful that any armed force would be able to comply with them in time of 
armed conflict. While this, as we shall see, is not true of all of these Draft Rules, 
a much more practical set of general principles was drafted by the ICRC for 
consideration by its group of experts in 1968. These principles would limit air 
bombardment to identified military objectives; would place upon the attacker 
the duty to use care in attacking the identified military objective; and would 
apply the principle of proportionality as between the identified military objective 
and any possible harm to the civilian population.162 These principles would 
clearly prohibit target-area bombing; but there does not appear to be any reason 
why such an important rule should not be specifically set out. 
It is clear now, as it has been in the past, that no rule has as yet been conceived 
which will give full protection to the civilian population and yet will be 
acceptable to Governments. However, if man can devise instruments to send a 
spaceship to the moon and have it land within a matter of yards from its target, 
man can certainly devise, ifhe has not already done so, instruments which will 
put a bomb exacdy on target. On the basis of this premise, the following rules 
on aerial bombardment are suggested: 
1. Terror Bombing Prohibited. Attacks directed against the civilian population, 
as such, whether with the object of terrorizing it, or for any other reason, are 
hib· d 163 pro Ite. 
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2. Target-Area Bombing Prohibited. It is forbidden to attack, as a single 
objective, an area including several military objectives at a distance from one 
another where members of the civilian population are located between such 
mili· b·· 164 tary 0 ~ectlves. 
3. Military Objectives. 
(a) Before bombing a military objective, the attacking force must have 
ffi · tl ·d ~.c d . h 165 su Clen y I enuue It as suc . 
(b) In bombardments against military objectives, the attacking force must 
take every possible precaution in order to avoid inflicting damage on the civilian 
ul · 166 pop atlon. 
(c) To constitute a military objective a target must fall within one of the 
. li d· h h 167 categones ste In t e annex ereto. 
It is believed that these rules will, under present and foreseeable technological 
standards, provide a maximum of protection to the civilian population, while 
placing acceptable limitations on the scope of strategic bombing. 
Conclusion 
Anned conflict is, by its very nature, unhumanitarian. However, 
humanitarian rules, properly applied, can do much to mitigate this situation. It 
is believed that were the proposals made herein to be adopted as part of the law 
of armed conflict, they would go far to provide additional needed protection 
for both combatant and civilian noncombatant. 
As has been stated, this paper represents an attempt to deal with only some of 
the present major inadequacies of the law of armed conflict; and their selection 
and priority must be ascribed to the personal predilections of the author. There 
are a number of other areas which might well have been included and which 
may well be considered by some to have equal, or even greater, importance. 
These might include: enforcement of the law of armed conflict; combat at sea, 
particularly submarine warfare; the status of guerrillas and partisans; the use of 
starvation as a weapon; etc. The selection made of the subjects to be discussed 
should certainly not be considered as in any way denigrating the importance to 
the cause of humanitarianism in armed conflict of many other such subjects. 
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Agenda item 62 
APPENDIX 1 
RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
[on the report of the Third Committee (A/7433)] 
2444 (XXIII). Respect for human rights in armed conflicts 
TI,e General Assembly, 
Recognizing the necessity of applying basic humanitarian principles in all armed conflicts, 
Taking note of resolution XXIII on human rights in armed conflicts, adopted on 12 May 1968 
by the Intemational Conference on Human Rights,1 
Affinning that the provisions of that resolution need to be implemented as soon as possible, 
1. Affinns resolution XXVIII of the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross held at 
Vienna in 1965, which laid down, inter alia, the following principles for observance by all 
governmental and other authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts: 
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not 
unlimited; 
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as such; 
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the hostilities and 
members of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as much as possible; 
2. Invites the Secretary-General, in consultation with the International Committee of the Red 
Cross and other appropriate international organizations, to study: 
(a) Steps which could be taken to secure the better application of existing humanitarian 
international conventions and rules in all armed conflicts; 
(b) The need for additional humanitarian international conventions or for other appropriate 
legal instruments to ensure the better protection of civilians, prisoners and combatants in all armed 
conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use of certain methods and means of warfare; 
3. Requests the Secretary-General to take all other necessary steps to give effect to the provisions 
of the present resolution and to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session on 
the steps he has taken; 
4. Further requests Member States to extend all possible assistance to the Secretary-General in 
the preparation of the study requested in paragraph 2 above; 
5. Calls upon all States which have not done so to become parties to the Hague Convention 
of 1899 and 1907,2 the Geneva Protocol of 19253 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.4 
FOOTNOTES 
1748th plenary meeting, 
19 December 1968. 
1. See Final Act oj the International Cot!forence on Human Rights (United Nations publication, 
Sales No.: E. 68. XIV.2), p. 18. 
2. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The Hague Convention and Declarations 
1899-1907 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918). 
3. League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. XCIV (1929), No. 2138. 
4. United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 75 (1950), Nos. 970-973. 
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the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Anned Conflict (249 U.N.T.S. 215) ilio falls in this 
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3. International Committee of the Red Cross, Reaffirmation and Development of the Laws and 
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mine.) 
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despite the inhospitable atmosphere. Thus, naval conferences were held in Washington in 1922 and in London 
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effective result, merely scratched the surface of the work which needed to be done. 
11. It is essential to bear in mind that to a considerable extent the existing law of war was observed during 
World War II. True, there were many well publicized violations of that law, the so-called "conventional war 
crimes." But see Baxter, "The Role of Law in Modem War," 1953 Proc. Am. Soc. Int'l L. 90, 92 where the 
following appears: 
"Those who are most scornful of the attempts which the law of war makes to mitigate human suffering 
in war inevitably point to the barbarities which were practiced in the second World War. These accusations 
overlook the extent to which states did comply with the law of war, the advantage of a fixed standard against 
which to measure the conduct of those who were the most flagrant in the violation of all international law, 
and the subsequent vindication of the validiry of the norms ofinternationallaw through the imposition of 
sanctions in the war crimes proceedings .... " 
12. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of the First 
Session, 1949 Ybk. Int'I L. Comm'n 281. And the International Law Commission did not stand alone. See, 
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gens contemporain" in Melange Basdevant 1-2, 7 (1960); and Pietet, "The Need to Restore the Laws and 
Customs Relating to Anned Conflict," Rev. Int'l Comm'n]ur., No. I (March 1969), 22, 37. 
14. Actually, the 1907 Hague Regulations (note 9 supra) were in large part a comparatively minor revision 
of the Regulations attached to the 1899 Second Hague Convention, 32 Stat. 1803; I Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 
129 (1907). 
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Cross: Results in the Legal Field," 7]. Int'l Comm'n]ur., 3, 11 (1966): 
" ••• whereas the ruined cities [of World War II] have been rebuilt, the States have done nothing to 
restore the Hague Rules, which vanished under the same ruins •.. While the techniques of offensive action 
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The Secretary-General's Report on Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict, N7720, para. 131, is to 
the same effect, stating that military-technical developments "have brought major changes which the authors 
of existing international instruments could not envisage." And that many governments share the belief that 
affirmative action is needed in this area is demonstrated by a number of the answers received by the 
Secretary-General in response to his inquiry regarding the preparation of N7720. See the replies of Finland 
(at 76 of the original United Nations document); Hungary (at 77); Morocco (at 82); Norway (at 82); and 
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Forum of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. It will be referred to simply as "the Report" 
or as N7720, and will be cited as N7720. 
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the United Nations, is noted in AJ7720, para. 19. 
17. Resolution XXIII of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, April-May 1968 
(United Nations publication, Sales No.: E. 68. XIV 2), at 18. 
18. See Appendix 1 hereto. 
19. See note 15 supra. 
20. It will be noted that operative paragraph 1 has now been given a somewhat different emphasis, an 
emphasis of a type which has tc:nded to permeate all United Nations actions in recent years. It is to be hoped 
that this will not be to the detriment of a revision and modernization of the general law of war which, of 
course, is, or should be, largely applicable in both international and internal conflicts. 
21. "Powerful" in the sense that it has strong support from people all over the world who are acquainted 
with and who welcome its methods and objectives. Apart from its dedication to humanitarian endeavors, the 
ICRC has found that "belligerents necessarily consider this law [of war] as a single whole, and the inadequacy 
of the rules relating to the conduct of hostilities has a negative impact on the observance of the Geneva 
Conventions." ICRC, Reaffirmation 8. 
22. It has been the practice to refer to the rules governing the conduct of hostilities as "Hague" law and 
to the rules governing the treatment of people (wounded and sick, prisoners of war, civilians) as "Geneva" 
law. See, for example, Pictet, note 13 supra, at 23. There is no merit to such a distinction. The 1899 and the 
1907 Hague Regulations dealt with, inter alia, prisoners of war and military occupation. Those subjects are 
now covered in whole or in part by the Third and Fourth 1949 Geneva Conventions, respectively (see note 
25 i,ifra). And the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol (see note 84 infra) as well as the ICRC's Draft Rules (see note 
26 irifra) are both concerned with permissible weapons, methods of attacks, etc., subjects which are basic to 
the Hague Regulations. Were it not for the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention (see note 2 supra), it might well 
be assumed that, the Netherlands no longer having the neutral status which it enjoyed prior to World War 
II, the nations of the world prefer to discuss subjects dealing with hostilities in still-neutral Switzerland. In any 
event, whether it is "Hague" law governing the conduct of hostilities or "Geneva" law governing the treatment 
of persons, its ultimate objective is humanitarian in nature. 
23. This new version was the 1929 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditions of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, 47 Stat. 2074; 118 L.N.T.S. 303; 27 Am.]. Int'IL. Supp. 43 (1933). 
24. The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021; 118 
L.N.T.S. 343, 27 Am.]. Int'IL. Supp. 59 (1933). 
25. The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Conditon of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field (the "First" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3114; 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the 1949 Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea (the "Second" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3217; 75 U.N.T.S. 85; the 1949 Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (the "Third" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3316; 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; 47 Am.]. Int'lL. Supp. 119 (1953); and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection 
ofCi'lilian Persons in Time of War (the "Fourth" Convention), 6 U.S.T. 3516; 75 U.N.T.S. 287; 50 Am. 
]. Int'l L. Supp. 724 (1956). Regarding this achievement Spaight is reported to have said: 
"The historians of the future will be puzzled by the conclusion of three [sic] new Geneva Conventions 
in 1949, and the failure of the powers who agreed to them to do anything to regulate those methods of war 
which, if continued, will make the humanitarian provisions of those Conventions read like hypocritical 
nonsense." 
Quoted in Dunbar, "The Legal Regulation of Modern Warfare," 40 Trans. Grot. Soc. 83, 91 (1955). 
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26. This is the Fourth Convention, note 25 supra. Of course, even the ICRC is not always immediately 
successful in its humanitarian efforts. In 1957 it presented to the XIXth International Conference of the Red 
Cross, meeting in New Delhi, its Draft Rules for the Limitation of the Dangers Incurred by the Civilian 
Population in Time of War. The Conference adopted a resolution requesting the ICRC to transmit the Draft 
Rules to the Governments. To quote the ICRC Director-General: 
"[T]heir replies took the form of a crushing silence, with the exception of a few well-disposed countries. 
The great powers, in particular, remained silent ... " 
Pictet, note 15 supra, at 12. 
27. Operative subparagraphs 1 (a), (b), and (c) of AIRES/2444 (XXIII) were taken verbatim from the 
Red Cross resolution which is itself cited in the opening part of operative paragraph 1 of the United Nations 
resolution. The General Assembly omitted a fourth paragraph of the Red Cross resolution which stated "that 
the general principles of the Law of War apply to nuclear and similar weapons." 
28. See Resolutions X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVII, and XVIII, 9 Int'! Rev. Red Cross 613-19 (1969). 
Of particular relevance is the following extract from Resolution XIII, in which the Conference 
"requests the ICRC on the basis of its report [ICRC, Reaffirmation] to pursue actively its efforts in this 
regard with a view to: 
1. proposing, as soon as possible, concrete rules which would supplement the existing humanitarian law, 
2. inviting governmental, Red Cross and other experts representing the principal legal and social systems in 
the world to meet for consultations with the ICRC on these proposals, 
3. submitting such proposals to Governments for their comments, and 
4. if it is deemed advisable, recommending the appropriate authorities to convene one or more diplomatic 
conferences of States parties to the Geneva Conventions and other interested States, in order to elaborate 
international legal instruments incorporating those proposals." 
29. As of October 15, 1969, just over 20 years from the date on which they were signed, the four 1949 
Geneva Conventions had 125 ratifications and accessions. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 646 (1969). (The data 
contained in note 49 of AI7720 is incorrect. That contained in Annex 1m of AI7720 is correct.) It should be 
observed that all of the great powers are Parties to these Conventions. It is interesting to note that the practice 
of Governments is apparently contrary to the decision of the International Law Commission discussed in the 
text in connection with note 12 supra. Ratifications and accessions to these "war" conventions far exceed 
those to any of the conventions drafted by the Commission, as important as these latter are. 
30. See text in connection with note 12 supra. 
31. ICRC, Reaffirmation 11 
32. Para. 21. 
33. As further evidence of the post-World War II antipathy to the use of the word "war," it might be 
noted that, apart from Article 107 referring to World War II, it is not used anywhere in the Charter of the 
United Nations; instead we find such terms as "international disputes," "breaches of peace," "acts of 
aggression," etc. Universal adoption of the term "armed conflict," a term already familiar to those acquainted 
with the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1954 Hague Cultural Convention, will certainly result in 
uniformity oflanguage-even if some who are less able to accept new ideas will, for a time, have to think 
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34. This problem is, of course, also of major importance with respect to internal conflict (civil war) and 
the question of the application of one of the so-called "common" articles (Article 3) of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
35. 36 Stat. 2259; 2 Am.]. Int'l L. Supp. 85 (1908). 
. 36. " •.. Thus the wars ofItaly with Abyssinia in 1935, of]apan with China in 1937, of Germany with 
Poland in 1939, of Russia with Finland in the same year, and of]apan with the United States in 1941, opened 
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37. Pictet (eel), Commentary on the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
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39. Pictet, Third Commentary 22-23. 
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41. ICRC, Reaffirmation 94. 
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armed conflict which is, without question, another area requiring major action. 
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somewhat beyond the comparable provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, it is suggested that the 
majority oflaw-abiding States have come to realize that there will always be a few delinquents among them 
and that only the absolute knowledge of automatic, effective, and universal sanctions will tend to keep the 
delinquent States in line. (The sanctions against Rhodesia can scarcely be described with those adjectives!) 
51. Certainly, the 125 ratifications of and accessions to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which were 
drafted before many of the acceding States were even in existence as members of the international community, 
were not obtained merely because of an overwhelming urge on the part of nations to be Parties to it; they 
were obtained because of moral and humanitarian pressures and because few nations were willing to be pointed 
at as not having accepted these great humanitarian expressions. 
52. Can there be any great doubt that President Nixon's announcement concerning his intended actions 
with respect to chemical and biological warfare (see section 3 irifra) was motivated not only by humanitarian 
considerations but also by the increasing feeling of isolation which the United States was being compelled to 
endure in this respect, as well as diplomatic pressure from friends, resolutions of the General Assembly, 
resolutions of the ICRC, etc.? 
53. Levie, "Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power," 55 AmJ. Int'l L. 374, 376 (1961). 
54. Ibid., 377-78. 
55. See note 24 supra. 
56. The basic article relating to the Protecting Power is one of the common articles, Article 8/8/8/9. 
References to this institution appear throughout the Conventions. See Levie, note 53 supra, at 380-81, where 
there is a list of36 articles in the Prisoner-of-War Conv~ntion containing references to the Protecting Power. 
57. Common Article 10/10/10/11 covers this latter subject. The U.S.S.R. and the other Communist 
countries all reserved to these articles. 
58. AI7720, para. 213. 
59. Ibid. 
60. It is probable that the United States has not even attempted to secure the designation of a Protecting 
Power in Vietnam because such action would appear to constitute a legal recognition not only of North 
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61. AI7720, at 78 of the original United Nations document. 
62. Ibid., at 91. 
63. Ibid., para. 215. See also para. 203. 
64. "Nigeria/Biafra: Armed Conflict with a Vengeance," Rev. Int'} Comm'nJur., No.2 aune 1969) 
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158 Levie on the Law of War 
65. See note 28 supra. In view of the tact that the 1949 Geneva Conventions clearly indicate that the 
activities of the Protecting Power and of the ICRC are complementary and not alternative (see Levie, note 
53 supra, at 394-96), it is difficult to understand why the resolution was phrased in the disjunctive. 
66. ICRC, Reaffirmation, at 7, where the following appears: 
" •.. Thus the wars ofItaly with Abyssinia in 1935, of Japan with China in 1937, of Germany with Poland 
in 1939, of Russia with Finland in the same year, and of Japan with the United States in 1941, opened without 
a formal declaration of war." -
To the same effect see ibid., 87-88. 
67. Common Article 9/9/9/10 is the basic provision of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions relating to 
the activities of the ICRC. Paragraph 3 of common Article 10/10/10/11, concerning replacements and 
substitutes for Protecting Powers, permits the ICRC to offer its services to perform the humanitarian functions 
of the Protecting Power when there is no Protecting Power. This is probably the basis upon which the ICRC 
has acted in the post-1949 Geneva Conventions era. One of its more successful recent efforts was in connection 
with the Honduras-Salvador conflict. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 493-96 (1969), 10 ibid., 95-105 (1970). 
68. AI7720, para. 226. Italy suggested considering the possibility of "delegating authority to the 
International Red Cross, so that that body may, in the case of armed conflict, ensure that its own representatives 
are continually present in the belligerent countries throughout the duration of the conflict." Ibid., at 79 of the 
original United Nations document. Asomewhatsimilarsuggestion was made by the group of experts convened 
by the ICRC. ICRC, Reaffirmation 107. 
69. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et Ie Conflit de Coree: Recueil des Documents, passim 
(2 vols., 1952); British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea 33-34 (1955). 
70. "The International Committee and the Vietnam Conflict," 6 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 399, 402-03 
(1966); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1970, p. 2B, col. 1. 
71. Strangely enough, it has apparendy been permitted to function with virtually no restrictions in Israel 
for the protection of both prisoners of war and of civilians in the occupied territory. See, for example, 8 Int'l 
Rev. Red Cross 18-19 (1968); 9 ibid., 173-76,417-19,488, and 640. On the other hand, the United Nations 
has encountered some difficulty in making an investigation of the treatment of civilians in the occupied territory 
because of the Israeli position that the resolution calling for it was biased and one-sided. However, even the 
International Conference of the Red Cross found it necessary to express concern about the plight of these 
people. 9 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 613 (1969). 
72. The Report also makes a suggestion to this latter effect N7720, para. 217. It is entirely possible, 
however, that some States, notably Switzerland and Sweden, which did yeoman work as Protecting Powers 
during both World Wars, would not wish to shoulder these additional, and potentially controversial, problems. 
This would make the solution herein suggested all the more necessary. It might be appropriate to cover this 
eventuality by providing for a possible division of functions, where desired, the Protecting Power, if there be 
one, performing the traditional functions with respect to wounded and sick, prisoners of war, and civilians, 
and the substitute performing the function with respect to the conduct of hostilities. 
73. In ICRC, Reaffirmation 89-90, this is ascribed to the tact that many of the conflicts since 1949 have 
been of an internal nature; but what of Korea, the Yemen, Vietnam, the Middle East, etc.? In none of these 
conflicts has there been a Protecting Power. 
74. In N7720, para. 216, it is suggested that a new organ be created which could "offer its services in 
case the Parties do not exercise their choice." For the reasons already advanced, it is not belived that any system 
other than one which operates automatically will constitute a solution to the problem. 
75. This calls for selection by one State, acceptance by the State so selected, and approval by the State 
on whose territory the Protecting Power is to operate. See Levie, note 53 supra, at 383. 
76. The Report (N7720, para. 218) makes two suggestions with respect to the legal effect of the 
designation of a Protecting Power or of an international organ as a substitute therefor: (1) that the Protecting 
Power, or the substitute, should be considered as an agent of the international community and not merely of 
one belligerent State; and (2) that the designation, being solely humanitarian in purpose, should have no legal 
consequences. The first comment is already true under the 1949 Geneva Conventions, although the term 
"Parties to the Convention" is deemed appropriate rather than "international community" (see Levie, note 
53 supra, at 382-83); and the second comment might well be accomplished by the use of a provision such as 
that appearing in the last paragraph of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions: "The application of the 
preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This provision was eventually 
applied during the French-Algerian conflict of the late 1950s and early 1960s. 
77. The ICRC experts were also of this opinion. ICRC, Reaffirmation 89 and 91. Had such an 
international body heretofore existed with such powers and duties, there could have been immediate 
investigations of allegations of such charges as the use of gas in the Yemen by the United Arab Republic, of 
bacteriological agents in Korea by the United Nations Command, etc. In this regard, see Joyce, Red Cross 
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International 201 (1959). In fact, it is probably safe to say that under these circumstances many such allegations 
would never be made in the first place! 
78. The subject is there discussed at length. Aln20, paras. 216-225. Despite the cautious defense of the 
use of a political organization as a Protecting Power, made in the last paragraph cited, it would appear that, 
for the reasons heretofore stated (see text in connection with note 46 supra), the creation of a new, non-political 
body is basically the position taken by the Report. 
79. See note 57 supra. The reservations were justified. The article, in effect, authorizes the Detaining 
Power to unilaterally select a substitute for the Protecting Power. The reservations would merely require 
agreement on the part of the Power of Origin, as in the case of the selection of the Protecting Power itself. 
See note 75 supra. Of course, were it a Party to the new convention which we are discussing, it would have 
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Some Major Inadequacies in the Existing Law Relating to the 
Protection of Individuals During Armed Conflict 
Addendum 
This Working Paper for the 14th Hammarskjold Forum conducted by the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York was written in 1970. Since that 
time there has been no change in the status of the first problem mentioned, the 
absence of "a method for the automatic determination that a particular State 
relationship requires the application of the law of armed conflict." Article 1 of 
the 1907 Convention (II) Relative to the Opening of Hostilities requires a "previous 
and explicit warning, in the form either of a declaration of war, giving reasons, 
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or an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war. " This provision has become 
a nullity. Article 2 of the four 1949 Geneva ConventionsJor the Protedion oj War 
Victims provides that these Conventions become applicable "in all cases of 
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized 
by one of them." The lack of value of this provision was demonstrated during 
the hostilities in Vietnam where the North Vietnamese disregarded it by merely 
asserting that all captured American personnel were war criminals captured in 
flagrante delicto. There have been innumerable international armed conflicts since 
1970 but in not one instance has there been a formal declaration of war or any 
other affirmative action indicating that the international law of war was deemed 
applicable. The last known compliance with the cited provision was when the 
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on 8 August 1945 during World War II. 
The second item discussed was "the need for a method which will ensure the 
presence in the territory of each State party to an armed conflict of a Protecting 
Power or an international body with adequate authority to police compliance 
with that law." The international community had an opportunity to correct this 
defect but failed miserably, The Diplomatic Conference which met in Geneva 
from 1974 to 1977 before completing the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions 018 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection ojVictims of International 
Anned Conflicts (protocol I) drafted provisions (Article 5 thereof) which once again 
mean that there will usually be no Protecting Power and no substitute for a 
Protecting Power. (The United States has not as yet ratified that Protocol.) In the 
conflict in Korea there were no Protecting Powers. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) offered its services to both sides. The 
United Nations Command (UNC) accepted the offer and the ICRC made over 
100 inspections ofUNC prisoner of war facilities. The North Koreans and the 
Chinese Communists never even deigned to answer the ICRC's offers. There 
is nothing in the 1977 Protocol I which will change that situation as every action 
is dependent upon the willingness of the Party to the conflict. Thus, if the system 
for designating a Protecting Power fails, as it probably will, a sort of lottery 
system may be instituted, but its value is dubious; and the ICRC may offer its 
services as a substitute, but the functioning of the ICRC as such a substitute "is 
subject to the consent of the Parties to the conflict"--a consent which countries 
like North Korea and the People's Republic of China, and a number of other 
nations, will not give. 
The third item discussed was "the need for a complete and total prohibition 
of the use in armed conflict of any and all categories of chemical and biological 
weapons." An addendum to the article entitled Nuclear, Chemical and Biological 
Weapons in this collection updates the subject. 
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The final item discussed in that paper was "the need for a complete code 
governing the use of air power in armed conflict with emphasis on the outright 
prohibition of any type of bombing which has as its basic target the civilian 
population." Some progress has been made in this area. Article 51 (2) of the 1977 
Additional Protocol I prohibits making the civilian population the object of attack, 
Articles 54(2) and 56 thereof contain provisions aimed at protecting the civilian 
population from attack. Article 2(1) of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions 
on the Use if Incendiary Weapons (protocol III to the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions 
or Restrictions on the Use cif Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to 
be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects) specifically prohibits attacks 
on the civilian population by incendiary weapons; and Article 2(2) thereof 
prohibits attacks on a military objective located within a concentration of 
civilians by air delivered incendiary weapons. (The United States has not as yet 
ratified this Protocol, although it has ratified the. convention and Protocols I and 
IIthereo£) 
